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Abstract
Through a well managed discourse of independence successive
Commonwealth Governments have been able to have very extensive
Executive intrusions in state audit accepted as benign and untainted by
political interests, thereby maintaining an illusion of an unfettered,
autonomous state audit function. This discourse of state audit
independence has been successful in embedding an interpretation of
independence at odds with the operational reality. A conditional form
of independence has been promoted as substantive independence and
has thereby created multiple and often conflicting beliefs about what is
and what ought to be the nature of independence in state audit. The
discourse has confused differences in the independence of the person
ofthe state auditor and the independence ofhis Office.
•
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THE ENGENDERING OF A CHIMERA:
SOURCES OF INDEPENDENCE FOR
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH STATE AUDIT:
INTRODUCTION
With the adoption of the main tenets of British state audit in 1901 by the Australian
Commonwealth Government also came an implicit set of beliefs about the form of
independence desirable for state audit and the sufficiency of the existing mechanisms to
protect independence from threat (Tickner, House ofRepresentatives (HR) debates', 6
April 1989. p.1l55; Senate debates. 6 April 1989, p.ll09i. These beliefs have
characterised Australian state audit until the present. However, recent, well publicised
differences between the Commonwealth Auditor-General and the Executive
Government have highlighted the imperfections and the ambiguous nature of the
independence of state audit by exposing the level of Executive involvement in the
operations of the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)3 (Senate debates, 9
October 1991; The Australian 10 June 1993; Canberra Times, 6 November 1993;
Financial Review, 23 November 1993). Introduction of the proposed Auditor-General
Bill into the Commonwealth Parliament in mid 1994 served to accentuate the
contentious nature of Australian state audit independence (Australian Audit Office
(AAO). 1989. Response to Report 296; Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA),
Report 331. September 1994; ANAO, Parliament's Right to Know, Audit Report
No.43. 1993-4).
The period since the investigation by the JCPA into the Office of the Auditor-General
in 1988 was especially testing for Auditor-General Taylor as he sought to have the
Labor Government implement the Committee's findings which favoured more
independence for state audit. At times the level of acrimony between the major players
in state audit has led some influential members of the Executive and state audit to
-
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question the continued existence of state audit in its present guise (JCPA, 1988,
Inquiry into the Australian Audit Office, Minutes of Evidence, Auditor-General
Monaghan, p.536; Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), 1991-2, Annual Report,
p.x). Compared to the previous history of the audit office, these have been
extraordinary times, bringing to mind the experiences of the Canadian Auditor-
General, Maxwell Henderson, in the sixties and early seventies (Henderson 1984). Yet,
despite the conflagrations of passions, clashes of egos (HR debates, Dawkins, 26 May
1993, p.935) and allusions to a dark future for state audit it has managed to withstand
the assaults of its detractors, although it has not come away unscathed from these
confrontations: staff numbers have been reduced by over 200 and staff morale has
continued to decline (Financial Forum, October 1994). Throughout his ongoing
differences with the Executive, Auditor-General Taylor maintained that his main
concerns were to ensure that he was able to fulfil efficiently the requirements of his
mandate on behalf of Parliament and that the independence of his Office was
strengthened. In the absence of Executive enthusiasm for the reform of state audit,
Taylor had sought to publicise the vulnerable position of his officers, as exposed by the
JCPA (Report 296, 1989), and thereby to emphasise the crucial and well recognised
role which independence plays in state audit (Financial Forum, October 1994).
The need in all forms of democratic governance for a state auditor and for the state
auditor to be independent are undisputed in the literature and in practice (INCOSAI,
1983, Recommendations of the 9th Conference of INCOSAI, 1977, p.85; American
Accounting Association (AAA) 1973, p.13; Bishop, Senate debates, 17 June 1991,
p.4686; Australian Society of Certified Practicing Accountants 1994). To deny the
relevance of independence to the office of the state auditor is to question the value of
and, as a consequence, the need for the very existence of state audit. Pois in his study
ofthe United States General Accounting Office (GAO), observed that:
4
there is such widespread acceptance of independence as a sine qua non
of state audit that there seems to be little point to engage in the
academic exercise of marshalling the arguments in support of this
proposition (1981, p.70; see also Kimball 1976, p.40).
Unfortunately, adoption of a similar stance in Australia has tended to circumvent
discussion of the genesis and the role of independence in state audit. By starting with
acceptance of the importance of independence a presumption is made that
independence is not only inherent to state audit but that independence in this context
has a clear meaning. A recent paper by Funnell (1994) has shown that neither of these
beliefs is correct within the context ofWestminster governance.
Given the importance accorded to independence for state auditors (Heinig in
Normanton 1966, p.402; INCOSAI 1983, p.89; Knighton 1979, p.6), whether in
Australia's form of Westminster governance or elsewhere, the resounding silence on
this subject in the academic literature is surprising. There has been little or no
discussion of how interpretations of state audit independence have been constructed
and sustained nor has any concerted attempt been made to identify the groups and
events which have played the greatest roles in the construction of meaning. The work
of Parker and Guthrie (1991,1993) and Hamburger (1989), for example, examines
influences on changes in the state auditor's mandate, notably efficiency auditing, and
emerging difficulties which these create for traditional understandings of the role of
state audit. Their work, however, does not examine the nature of the independence
which underpins the work of state audit. The current work seeks to fill this void. The
silences which surround the study of state audit independence are all the more
remarkable in light of the level of concern expressed about independence in private
sector audit (Levin 1976; Sharafand Mautz 1960; Nicholls and Price 1976; Cook and
Winkler 1976; AAA 1973; Wolnizer 1994). It is as if state audit independence has been
treated very much with Miss Havisham's wedding cake'' in mind: while ever it is left
untouched it will stand.
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It is the purpose of this paper to examine the means by which successive Australian
Commonwealth Executive Governments have constructed a discourse of state audit
independence which has been successful in masquerading a limited or conditional form
ofindependence as substantive independence. Independence has been, and continues to
be, conditional primarily because the Executive controls the financial and human
resource levels of the state auditor's Office. The paper establishes that acceptance of
state audit independence as substantive has been accomplished by the Executive
encouraging confusion between independence of the person of the state auditor, in
Australia the Auditor-General, with that of his Office. To accomplish this the
Executive has stressed personal characteristics of the state auditor and relevant
provisions of audit legislation as both indications and guarantees of the independence
of state audit, as opposed to the independence of the state auditor". Until recently this
approach has been very effective in sustaining an image of an independent state audit
function but without placing the state auditor beyond the reach of the Executive. After
nearly 90 years ofcomparatively docile auditors-general the outspokenness of Auditor-
General Taylor therefore was all the more shocking to the Executive.
This paper firstly examines the political importance of an independent state audit
function and therefore its interest to the Executive. It then shows how the Executive
has promoted state audit independence as substantive, rather than conditional,
primarily through the public image of the person of the state auditor and by confusing
the legislated guarantees of his' independence with that of his officers. The paper
finally establishes that Executive involvement in state audit has been given great
potency through its control of the resources allocated to state audit.
THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF STATE AUDIT INDEPENDENCE
Independence is a qualitative characteristic of audit: there are no universal criteria to
detect its extent or even its presence. Any measurements of independence depend upon




verification. There is no absolutist, apolitical meaning to independence. Instead, it is a
socially constructed belief with strong political dimensions, in the sense of being
implicated in the contests of rival power groupings. Independence is of interest in audit
mainly because it can be seen to be of sectarian service to interested parties, certainly
not to improve the precision and engineering ofaudit for its own sake. This has caused
interpretations of independence within state audit to be the target of capture by
powerful interest groups. Accordingly, independence in the context of state audit has
meant that which dominant interest groups have allowed it to mean; hence its nature as
a discourse" In the case of state audit in Australia, it has been the Executive which has
been extremely successful in creating and sustaining a discourse of independence, with
attendant and privileged interpretations of independence, which has been very much in
the Executive's own best interests.
Independence can be conceived as a relational state: one is independent from or in
respect to something. For state audit the relational state is most often taken to be in
reference to the Executive, although in Australia the state auditor has argued that he is
also independent ofParliament (AAO, Annual Report, 1991-92. p.3). According to the
AAO's Auditing Standards
an essential element in the independence of the Auditor-General is the
absence of any direction by the executive government in relation to the
Auditor-General's performance of his or her mandate. In particular the
Auditor-General should not carry out, modify or refrain from carrying
out an audit, or suppress or modify audit findings at the direction of a
minister of the government (1987, para.2.2.2.2).
Mosher also recognises that independence in the context of state audit
concerns the freedom of an individual or agency from outside pressures
or influence in the reaching of its decisions and carrying out its
activities. In this sense, independence is nearly synonymous with
objectivity, freedom from hierarchical, political, special interest,
personal, or other partial bias (1978, p.235).
L
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It would follow. therefore, that in order to ensure the state auditor's independence
from Executive pressures that the state auditor be administratively and financially
independent of the Executive. This paper will argue that this has never been the case in
Australia. Instead, the Executive has had recourse to numerous controls over the work
of the state auditor; controls which it has had accepted as benign through a discourse
of independence. Most importantly, the Office of the state auditor in Australia has
never been financially independent of the Executive. Further, the state auditor in
Australia has never enjoyed administrativecontrol over his own Office; he has not been
free from Executive prying and final say. Indeed, it was not the intention of the
Australian 190/ Audit Act, or any subsequent amendments to the Audit Act, to create a
state auditor who was beyond the influence of the Executive. This was not only
inconsistent with the development of Westminster state audit from the mid 19th
century (see Funnell 1994) but was also antithetical to Executive interests.
The work of Cooper and Sherer (1984), Chua (1986), Hopwood (1987, p.213),
Laughlin (1987, pA80), Laughlin and Lowe (1990, p.16) and MacIntosh and Scapens
(1990, p.468) has shown that accounting practices, of which auditing is a prominent
component, can never be merely technical instruments. Rather, they need to be
recognised as being consistently partial; that the strategic outcomes of
accounting practices consistently ... favour specific interests in society
and disadvantage others (Cooper and Sherer quoted in Likierman,
1989, p.626).
Consistent with this approach, hegemonic perspectives of state audit conceive it as a
legitimising institution which provides a means by which current political arrangements
can be sustained (for example see Richardson 1987. p.342). By dominating state audit,
through the means detailed later in this paper, the Executive has been able to use the
rhetoric of independence to legitimise its actions and thereby secure its position. For
the Executive state audit has come to provide the means with which it can signal to the
electorate its competent management and its respect for the conventions of






obvious and far less contentious monitoring role with which it is characterised. Of
course, the Executive is only interested in favourable judgements from the state
auditor. Consequently, control or management of state audit becomes an important
prize for the Executive. The imprimatur of the state auditor, however, would be of
little value if he was perceived by the electorate to be influenced by the needs of the
Executive. Projection of the state auditor as an independent officer as being beyond
contest or dispute is therefore essential if state audit is to be of any use as a signalling
device to the Executive.
For state audit to be politically useful to the Executive the extent of its intrusions in
state audit had to be downplayed and disguised to enhance the appearance of
independence. Community expectations of independence have been primarily
conditioned by the appearance ofstate audit, as opposed to its substance, and the pious
expressions ofhomage paid to it by the Parliament and by the Executive (for examples
see HR debates: 13 October 1981, p.1914; 6 April 1989, p.1l53 and 3 May 1989,
p.1773). Nuances in the meanings attributed to state audit independence in apparently
unreserved Executive expressions of support for state audit can easily be lost by the
public:
it is common ground in this chamber that the independence of the
Auditor-General is fundamental to his or her role and it cannot be
compromised ... (T)here can be no question but that this Government
will defend and preserve the Auditor-General'sfimctional independence
(emphasis added) (Walsh, Senate debates, 1 November 1989, p.2717;
see also Button, Senate debates, 7 June 1989, p.3527).
A public ignorant for the most part of the very existence of state audit cannot be
expected to appreciate the finer points of the nature of the relationship of the state
auditor with the Executive and the Parliament (see NehI, HR debates, 6 April 1989,
p.1158). In particular, the public has been deceived into accepting a conditional form
of independence for substantive independence.
-
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SUBSTANTIVE INDEPENDENCE V. CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE
The discourse of state audit independence in Australia generally has been successful in
promoting independence as substantive independence. For the purposes of this paper
state audit will be defined as having substantive independence if: the Executive is not
permitted to determine the organisation of the state audit office, including staffing
levels and position categories; the Executive cannot influence the program and conduct
of audits and the dismissal, payment and appointment of the state auditor are beyond
the sole discretion of the Executive. Independence of this form requires that the state
auditor be staunchly independent in attitude and that his Office is not directly
financially dependent on the Executive", Substantive independence will only be
present, therefore, if state audit independence encompasses legal, fiscal and political
independence. Legal independence is derived from relevant statutes and can only be
interpreted in this context. It refers to statutory provisions which are designed to
protect the person of the state auditor and to identify and proscribe behaviour which
could be construed as interfering with the duties of a public officer. Political
independence is present if no successful overt or covert attempts are made by political
actors to influence the work of the state auditor. Financial independence is examined in
detail later in this paper. Substantive independence will also be affected by: the
cooperation of auditees, parliamentary support, Executive reactions to unfavourable
reports and the co-operation of central co-ordinating departments. State audit in
Australia has never experienced substantive independence.
At the heart of substantive independence is a system of beliefs about the standing of
the state auditor's authority as compared to potential sources of threat to his
independence. Goldman and Barlev (1974) have interpreted auditor independence as
the outcome of the ability of the auditor to withstand pressures by the auditee to
influence the auditor. In the public sector the auditor's ability to resist these pressures is
a function of the dependency of the state auditor on the Executive and the distribution
J
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of power between the Executive and the state auditor: "the greater the dependency ...
on the rewards and/or punishment that the other can mediate, the greater will be the
power of the party to gain compliance with '" (their) wishes" (Nichols and Price 1976,
p.337). For most purposes, constitutional imperatives determine that the advantage is
overwhelmingly the Executive's way.
Contrary to the image portrayed in the media and in Parliament, Australian state audit
independence has always been, and continues to be, a form of conditional
independence. or functional independence as the Minister for Finance, Senator Walsh,
preferred to refer euphemistically to the Auditor-General's independence'? (Senate
debates, 26 November 1987, pp.2479). The state auditor is conditionally independent
if he is at least capable of being free of detailed day-to-day direction in the
determination and conduct ofaudit and if his appointment and dismissal are beyond the
sole discretion of the Executive. In other words, the state auditor can be expected to
be unhindered in carrying out the functions associated with audit. To operate under a
conditional form of independence the state auditor will have limited control over his
staffing levels and appointments and will be not financially autonomous. This is very
much the form of independence to which the ANAO refers in its Auditing Standards
(see sections 2.2.1.2, 2.2.1.3, 2.2.2.2, 2.2.2.9).
Not only has the state auditor in Australia never been beyond the financial
proscriptions of the Executive but the Executive has seen this freedom as inconsistent
with its constitutional right to determine spending levels for all organisations requiring
appropriations from Parliament (Walsh, Senate debates, 26 November 1987, pp.2479-
80). Given the imperfect nature of conditional independence, qualities of the person of
the state auditor have assumed great importance for acceptance by interested parties of
a belief in the independence of state audit in contradistinction to the independence of
the Auditor-General.
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CONSTRUCTING INTERPRETATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE
Psychological Interpretations of State Audit Independence: Independence is a State of
Mind
Borrowing heavily from private sector practice, the discourse of state audit
independence has portrayed independence principally in terms of the state auditor's
professional and personal integrity, that is, his ability to carry-out his duties in an
unbiased and honest manner. Wolnizer (1987) has shown how, early in the
development of private sector audit, independence came to take on meanings more to
do with the state of mind of the auditor than anything to do with the process of audit
(see also Preston et.al. 1994). These beliefs were later embodied in the accounting
profession's statements of auditing ethics which characteristically conclude that
professional independence will exist only when a member "at all times performs his
work objectively and impartially and free from influence by any consideration which
might appear to be in conflict with this requirement" (lCAEW, 1988, Guide to
Professional Ethics; Mautz and Sharaf 1961). To have an independent state of mind is
to have "an attitude of impartiality and self reliance" (Ricchiute 1992, p.27). Australian
auditing standards, which the Auditor-General accepts as binding (AAO, Auditing
Standards, 1987), note that "(i)n order to achieve actual independence, professional
ethics stress the importance of the auditor's attitude of mind" (Australian Auditing
Principles (AUP) 32, para.12). This is amplified to mean that in both public and private
sector audit (AUP 32, para.5) the auditors
should be straightforward, honest and sincere in their approach to their
professional work. They must be fair and must not allow prejudice or
bias to override their objectivity. They should maintain an impartial
attitude and both be and appear to be free of any interest which might
be regarded, whatever its actual effect, as being incompatible with
integrity and objectivity (emphasis added) (Australian Auditing
Standards (AUS) 1, para. 16).
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Achievement of impartiality is therefore
heavily reliant upon the personal attributes of the individual. Without
believing in and supporting the need to remain independent of any bias,
personal interest, susceptibility to undue influence or pressure, the
auditor is unlikelyto achieve the appropriate altitude ofmind Personal
attributes essential to the maintenance of an independent frame of mind
include:
(a) integrity- the staunch observance of accepted standards of honesty
which must underlie all professional decisions and actions....
(b) objectivity- an unwillingness to allow prejudice or bias to influence
judgment and the maintenance ofa fair and impartial attitude; and
(c) strength ofcharacter- the ability to maintain integrity and objectivity
in the face of pressure from others. The opinion of the auditor is vital to
the credibility of financial reports, and the governing body, recognising
this, may seek to influence the auditor. Without the strength of
character to withstand such pressure the auditor will not be able to
express an independent opinion (AUP 32, para. B).
An independent audit, therefore, could be asssured if the auditor had an "independent
mind" (Senate debates, 6 May 1987, p.2386 and 27 May 1993, p.1474; Windal and
Corley 1980, p.30). Audit authorities accept that "an independent attitude ... (is) an
imperative needed to add credibility to a communicated opinion" (AAA 1973, p.16). It
is argued that it is this which will generate confidence in an auditor's work, not the
technical aspects of audit (AAA 1973, p.16). In his work on private sector audit,
Wolnizer has stressed that the notion of auditor independence has been interpreted so
exclusively in terms of the personal qualities of the auditor that there has been little or
no concern with the independence of either the tests carried out by the auditor or,
more importantly, with the independence of the evidence used to reach audit
conclusions (Wolnizer 1987, p.3). Independence has been overwhelmingly accepted as
inhering "in the attitudes of, and relations between, persons" (Wolnizer 1987, p.121).
In the case of state audit, the public might not be able to understand the audit process
or why they should have confidence in it but they would be more likely to understand
independence when it is given human form in the person of the state auditor.
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Standards, rules, regulations and legislation (see below) aid in the achievement of
independence but they are not certain guarantees. In the final analysis it will always be
the personal vigilance and integrity of the auditor which will determine whether the
image ofauditor independence is maintained:
(T)he personal qualities of the auditor are integral to the maintenance of
audit independence, but they cannot be maintained by rule or
regulations and it is incumbent upon the auditor to ensue that integrity,
objectivity and strength of character have been maintained (AUP 32,
para. 14)
Certainly this was the view of the Australian Auditor-General Steele Craik. When
asked by the British Public Accounts Committee (PAC) whether, in light of his long
career in the Treasury, his relationship with the Treasury impinged upon his
independence Steele Craik replied
not in the least '" I am not necessarily influenced by what they say or by
what they would like me to do. I do not feel that it impairs my
independence in the least (Great Britain, 1981, Inquiry into the Role of
the Comptroller and Auditor General, Minutes of Evidence, 11 June
1980, p.8).
The discourse of state audit independence has been particularly effective in forming a
perceived bond between the state auditor's integrity and the quality of his independence
and that ofhis Office. It is expected that if the state auditor is seen as independent then
the audit his Office conducts will be viewed similarly. Consequently, features which
bolster the perception of the state auditor's personal independence are the foundation
of confidence placed in the audits conducted by his Office, not a given set of desirable
characteristics of the technology of audit (ADS 1; AUP 32, para.9-11). The state
auditor's unquestioned personal integrity is promoted as the guarantee of independence
and objectivity in state audit. Certainly it is not usual to hold out his professional and
academic qualifications, which have not encompassed audit, as guarantees of
independence. As a result, there has been a high degree of 'blind faith' in relation to




regards to the independence of his Office. It has involved the deception that a highly
reputable, dignified, honourable and experienced public servant who is appointed as
the state auditor, often in the closing days of a distinguished public service career, will
not submit to threats to his independence and that his independence and that of his
Office are one in the same. The public and Parliament are asked to accept that a long
serving public servant is able to tum his back on a culture and network of personal and
professional relationships which nurtured him throughout his career and take on a new
set of loyalties and beliefs which are aimed at giving him something which he never
enjoyed before as a public servant; his independence. Even the very close ally of the
British state auditor, the PAC, has at times found this hard to believe: "it cannot be
easy for a former civil servant to transform himself from a colleague of other
accounting officers into their external auditor" (Report, 1980, p.LV). This reliance
upon the difficult-to-refute professional and personal integrity of the state auditor has
made the discourse of independence very persuasive. The state auditor has come to
personify independence: to question the state auditor's independence is to question his
integrity and state audit itself
When appointment of the state auditor has been immediately, and exclusively, before
retirementII it has been suggested that this is another means of demonstrating his
integrity and enhancing his independence from the Executive. According to this
argument, at this late stage in the state auditor's career he has nothing to gain from
favouring the Executive. A contrary and more convincing interpretation is that the 11th
hour appointment of the state auditor has been used by the Executive as a reward for
meritorious public service and thereby often, though not always, provided a means by
which the Executive has been given a high degree of assurance of the way the state
auditor will fulfil his mandate. This should not be construed, however, as suggesting
that the state auditor has been a mere puppet of the Executive. A survey of the public
record will dispel quickly this notion. Rather, the appointment of a tried, proven and
loyal member of the public service has been an attempt by the Executive to ensure a
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high degree of predictability in the views of the state auditor. The position of state
auditor is highly sought after in the public service; it has long been seen as a pinnacle of
public service positions (see for example Robinson 1924, p.148). Accordingly, it is less
likely, although not impossible as Auditor-General Taylor recently demonstrated, that
the state auditor would do something which would blot an otherwise unblemished
reputation. Late career appointments, therefore, have been used by the Executive as a
form ofdamage control and a recognition that political patronage still exists.
State audit is considerably more secretive than private sector audit, if only for the fact
that there is a close relationship between the auditees in the Executive and the auditor's
client, Parliament. In addition, Parliament customarily has been reluctant to get too
involved in questions ofaudit, preferring instead to devote a very meagre amount of its
time to reviewing the work of the state auditor and to rely on its standing committee
the JCPA. Reid and Forrest have observed that
when the preoccupation of one side of the assembly is in the
maintenance of the government's majority, and on the other side in its
destruction, members are not favourably disposed to concentrate on
housekeeping in public administration (1989, p.347).
In the absence ofan ever vigilant champion for state audit, the electorate is encouraged
to believe that the state auditor is promoting their interests as a consequence of the
state auditor's public assurances of his independence. These are given weight by
Executive and Parliamentary professions that the state auditor is indeed an independent
officer.
The qualities of uprightness of character, probity and honesty ensure that integrity is a
very amorphous and complex concept which is not easily challenged because it is not
readily empirically verifiable or easy to interpret. Reliance upon the auditor's state of
mind and integrity as both guarantees and evidence of independence is an advantage to




substantive; it is very difficult to refute the existence of independence. A state of mind
cannot be measured with objective criteria nor cannot it be observed directly (Cook
and Winkler 1976, p.46). It is only the actions of the auditors which can be observed.
Sharafand Mauntz agreed that
important as the concept of independence is to auditing, it is one of
those elusive ideas difficult to reduce to an easily understood definition.
Thus one searches in vain for a comprehensive authoritative statement
of the meaning of independence in auditing (1960, p.49).
A form of independence which is largely guaranteed by the attitude or state of mind of
the state auditor will depend very heavily upon maintaining the appearance of being
independent. Appearances are not only desirable but must be maintained at all costs
(Nichols and Price 1976, p.335). Most authors are agreed that the value of audit is
based on the perception that the auditor is independent
the conclusion reached by a knowledgeable observer in evaluating an
auditor's relationship is the ultimate test of whether such a relationship
would cause the auditor's appearance of independence to be impaired.
Appearance is essential to maintaining confidence in independence
(Cook and Winkler 1976, p.47; AUP 32, para.9).
Appearances and not the reality of independence will ultimately determine the
credibility of and confidence placed in the auditor: the "general impression is what is
carried to the public and to the people whom we audit. This is the whole role; there is
an important concept in this" (Great Britain, 1981, PAC, Minutes of Evidence of D.
Somers (from the Exchequer and Audit Departments), p.37; see also Shockley 1981,
p.785). If cracks in the appearance of independence of the state auditor cause the
target audience start to doubt the veracity of the auditor's independence the state
auditor has little else to provide a convincing case otherwise, as shown in the following
section.
In order to maintain the appearance of independence, the evanescent nature of
independence requires recourse to be made to surrogate measures of independence,
17
prominent amongst which are professional restrictions on associations between the
auditor and the auditee which influence the quality of ie. the confidence which can be
placed upon, the auditor's reports. To ensure this, the Auditor-General should not only
resist external political pressures but also give the appearance of not "being responsive,
to the wishes of particular political interests" (Monaghan 1985, p.15). The
Commonwealth Auditor-General has interpreted this as refusing any requests by the
Executive for the Auditor-General to undertake any functions which were outside his
clearly legislated mandate (see for example AAO Annual Report, 1984-85, p.51). Thus,
requests to undertake specific enquiries, something which the United States General
Accounting Office (GAO) would do, the Australian state auditor has seen as
"inconsistent with the Auditor-General's independent role" (Monaghan 1985, p.15).
The auditor must not get involved in providing advice on how auditee departments are
to carry out their duties or participate in the management of an auditee (AAO,
Auditing Standards 1987, paras.2.2.3.3 and 2.2.3.10).
Both the surrogates chosen for the qualities of independence as discussed above and
the metrication of these have been determined by the discourse of independence. The
discourse directs attention to qualities of audit and the auditor which are to represent
independence. Those who manage the discourse therefore are able to engineer the
dimensions of independence which set the boundaries ofadmissible discussion.
Appeals to the exemplary character of the state auditor by themselves are still not
enough to instil confidence in the independence of the state auditor and his Office. In
particular, legislation is needed to give form to the state auditor's independence. It is
demonstrated in the section following that the contributions of audit legislation to
beliefs about independence create the impression, or even confusion, that they are there
to guarantee the independence of the person of the state auditor and his Office when it
is only the former which receives any recognition in legislation. It is upon this mistaken
belief also that the discourse of independence has relied.
18
Legal Interpretations of State Audit Independence
The state auditor's independence is said to be guaranteed by provisions of the 1901
Audit Act (AAO, Annual Report 198-1-85, 1985, p.6). His statutory independence
results from the quasi-judicial method of his appointment, payment and dismissal and
his powers of investigation and reporting. The Audit Act of 1901 stipulates that the
Auditor-General will be appointed by the Governor-General but is silent on the means
with which prospective candidates for the position come to the notice of the Governor-
General (s.3). By custom the Governor-General has appointed on the suggestion of the
Prime Minister. Both these officers are members of the Executive: the Governor-
General is the representative of the titular head of the Executive while the Prime
Minister is appointed by the Governor-General. In addition, in Australia the central
financial and co-ordinating departments have been extremely influential in the
appointment of state auditors, invariably from their own ranks12. There is at the very
outset, therefore, a contradiction in the statutory independence of the state auditor
which the Executive has preferred not to give prominence: the state auditor is
appointed from and by the very group ofwhose activities he is to monitor.
Whereas the selection and retention of an auditor in the private sector is of crucial
concern to the investing stakeholders, there is no evidence that the electorate's
concerns and level of audit consciousness can be raised to the same levels over the
selection and activities of the state auditor. Ifnot for the press drawing the attention of
the public to the more sensational findings, most of the work of the state auditor goes
unnoticed by the stakeholders. In these circumstances reliance on the assurances of the
state auditor that he acts independently of auditees, in the sense of substantive
independence, is even more relevant in the public sector where there is no direct
relationship between the selection of the auditor and interested third parties, in this
case the electorate, and there is no opportunity to participate in the audit process.
Thus, unlike the private sector where the auditor is appointed by a meeting of the
..
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investing stakeholders of the firm, in the public sector the electors which comprise the
stakeholders have virtually no input in the selection of the state auditor. The link
between the electorate and state auditor selection is very tenuous indeed. Certainly it is
the elected representatives of the majority party in Parliament which may be seen to act
on behalfofthe electorate in the selection of the state auditor but these are members of
the Executive.
The method of appointment of the state auditor in Australia has been a source of
continual ambiguity and confusion in the relationship of the state auditor to the
Executive and to Parliament. At various times the state auditor has been referred to as
a public servant (Lusher, Senate debates, 13 October 1981, P.1914); an "officer of the
Crown" (Steele Craik reported by Lusher, Senate debates, 13 October 1981, p.1914)
and an "officer of Parliament" (Robinson 1924, p.152; HR debates, 17 November
1978, p.26; Bowen, Deputy Prime Minister, HR debates, 11 May 1987, p.2933). This
last description, despite high level Executive statements to the contrary 13, seems to
have been the most popular conception of the state auditor's constitutional position.
This has carried with it the implication that the state auditor works as a constituent
element of Parliament; that he is to do Parliament's bidding. Such an interpretation,
however, confused the fact that the state auditor for operational purposes had a closer
relationship to the Executive. After nearly a century of state audit in Australia the
Executive's role in the appointment of the state auditor still has the capacity to confuse
even Parliamentarians (Senate debates, 9 October 1991, p.1672).
As an additional prop to independence, in the original 1901 Audit Act no retirement
age was specified for the state auditor who was allowed to hold office "during good
behaviour". This was subsequently modified in 1926 to age 65 (Act No.18, s.(3);
s.(5A». It was given to the Governor-General to dismiss the Auditor-General but only
on the recommendation of both Houses of Parliament sitting in the same session (s.7).
The Auditor-General, however, could be suspended by the Governor-General without
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the prior approval of Parliament. Should the need for this arise, the Treasury (after
1978 it was the Minister for Finance) was also implicated for the Act required the
Treasury to lay before both Houses evidence to support the Auditor-General's
suspension (s.7(2». Given that dismissal of a state auditor is hedged with these very
public restrictions, it is imperative for the Executive to take great care in selecting a
predictable, if not compliant, state auditor.
The statutory provisions covering the appointment, dismissal and payment of the state
auditor when combined with assurances of the state auditor's personal integrity and
objectivity have been held out by both the state auditor and the Executive to be sure
guarantees of the independence of the Auditor-General and, by association, his Office
(Lidbetter 1986, p.9; Monaghan 1985, p.13). Report296 of the JCPA suggested that it
was "meaningful to discuss the independence of the Australian Audit Office in terms of
the independence of the Auditor-General" (1989, p.57). This implied that the
independence of the Auditor-General and the Office were one in the same. However,
the original audit legislation and subsequent amendments did not mention conditions of
service or the independence of members of the Auditor-General's office, apart from
noting that the Auditor-General had the power to appoint persons to inspect and audit
accounts (s.11(I ». Therefore, there are no legislative provisions designed to protect
the independence of the state auditor's staff Their only protection has been that which
might be reflected from the Auditor-General. In contradiction to the legislative
protections for the independence of the person of the state auditor, the independence
of his Office has not been real , substantive or readily apparent. INCOSAI in 1977
recognised that this was insufficient to ensure the independence of state audit. Instead,
they concluded that independence of the state audit office "is inseparably linked to the
independence of its members" (INCOSAI 1983, p.89). Nowhere is the importance of
this more evident than in the manner in which the state auditor receives the resources
for his Office.
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STATE AUDIT FINANCES AND INDEPENDENCE
The greatest threat to the operation of an independent state audit office in Australia,
which the Executive has not sought to highlight, has been the state auditor's
dependence on the Executive for the resources necessary to meet his audit mandate
(see Royal Commission on Navy and Defence Administration, 1918, Special Report,
30 December; AAO. Fourth Submission to the Royal Commission on Australian
Government Administration (RCAGA), 1974. p.2; AAO, Annual Report 1984-85,
1985. pp.6-7; JCPA 1989, chapter 2). For budget purposes the Auditor-General's
Office. although not him personally. came under the control of the Department of
Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) until responsibility was passed to the Department
of Finance in 19881.1. Therefore, "(I)ooked at idealistically " . (the Auditor-General's)
independence from the Executive" has not been "total" (emphasis added) (AAO,
Submission 3 to the RCAGA. 1974. p.3). Under the 1901 Audit Act payment of the
Auditor-General. not his Office. was to be taken out of the hands of the Executive and
Parliament by making a direct charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund (s.4). This
avoided the need for the salary of the Auditor-General to be dependent upon the
generosity of either the Executive or the Parliament when the annual appropriations
were laid before Parliament. His Office. however. was left exposed to the vagaries of
the Executive's mercy. Despite what would seem the very obvious extent of the
Executive's financial role in state audit they have been successful, until recently, in
convincing interested parties that this is more than balanced and checked by the
personal independence ofthe Auditor-General as guaranteed by relevant legislation and
his own integrity.
To Normanton, control of the resources of the state auditor. a non-Executive body, by
the Executive has been a "constitutional anomaly" (1966, p.374). In Australia this
created a "contradiction in the arrangements whereby an important auditee (the
Department of Finance) is the adviser to Government on the AAO's resources" (AAO,
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1989, Response to Report 296, p.l l ). Accordingly, the AAO strongly recommended
that there was
a need for new arrangements to be formulated which, as a minimum,
give the public greater scope through their elected representatives to
influence decisions affecting the allocation of resources to the AAO,
while retaining appropriate restraint on resource levels (AAO, 1989,
Response to Report 296, p.II).
Senator Walsh, when Minister for Finance, made it very clear that the finances of the
state auditor would continue to be treated by his Government like any other
department: "neither the Auditor-General nor anybody else, as long as I am Finance
Minister ... will be given ad lib access to the Government's bank account" (Senate
debates, 26 November 1987, p.2479). He informed the Senate that his government was
opposed to financial autonomy for the state auditor: the state auditor could only expect
to have "functional independence" ie. not be subject to ministerial direction in the
conduct and programming of audits, an interpretation which seemed to accord with
that of Auditor-General Monaghan (JCPA. 1988, Inquiry into the AAO, Minutes of
Evidence, p.444). Recent state auditors have recognised that the realities of
government mean that the state auditor cannot expect to achieve absolute financial
independence (AAO, Annual Report 198-1-85, 1985, p.6; JCPA. 1988, Minutes of
Evidence, Inquiry into the AAO, Monaghan p.552). The Executive would always need
to control the total revenue raised and total expenditures (see Pois 1981, p.21).
However, it wasn't so much a "blank cheque" which the state auditor has been seeking
as more openness and consultation in deciding upon the resources to be made available
to his Office (Taylor, Paper for the Senate, 28 August 1989).
Increasingly since 1988, in the absence of control over his Office's resources, the
functional independence of the state auditor, as alluded to by Senator Walsh, has been
seen as a hollow pretence (Stone, Senate debates, 26 November 1987, p.2911 and
Bishop, I December 1987, p.l l l l). Both sides ofParliament have agreed that financial
L
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control of the state auditor's Office by the Executive has provided it with the
opportunity indirectly, and thus unobtrusively, to influence (or tyrannise as Senator
Baume described the Executive's part in state audit) the state auditor's independence by
hampering his work (Watson, Senate debates, 10 December 1987, p.2880; Tickner,
HR debates, 6 April 1989, p.1153; JCPA, 1988, Minutes of Evidence, Humphrey,
Inquiry into the AAO, p.475; Baume, Senate debates 6 April 1989, p.1229). These
concerns were also voiced at the time in the community (Australian Financial Review,
Editorial, 1 December 1987). On other occasions when this implication has arisen, the
Executive has been quick to reassure in enduring terms that it would not use its
financial controls to
interfere unnecessarily in arrangements of staff ... The Auditor-General
has been placed by the Audit Act in a very strong position, and his right
to report at any time direct to Parliament is a sufficient safeguard
against undue interference. Greater power seems neither necessary nor
desirable (emphasis added) (Royal Commission on Naval and Defence
Administration, "Special Report on the Auditor General", 1917-18-19).
More than seventy years after the report of the 1918 Royal Commission on Naval and
Defence Administration the situation had changed very little. By the completion of his
short term as state auditor, Monaghan was disillusioned by Executive control over
state audit resources. In his submission to the 1988 inquiry into the AAO, he firstly
commended the Executive's departments on their co-operation and "the formal
recognition of the independence of the audit function". He then expressed grave
concern about
the determination, by the auditee, of the resource provision to the
Commonwealth's external auditor, and the consequent conflict of
interest which confronts the Department ofFinance.
I had entertained the notion that, in a practical sense, there could be
conventional understandings which would ameliorate the impact of the
ill-principle anomaly. But experience during the 1986-87 budget
processes led me to conclude that I had been mistaken in the earlier
VIew.
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My complaint was with the processes engaged in and attitudes
expressed by the Department, and the ill that these bode for the AAO's
future.
In its approach to the 1986-87 budget processes the Department
seemed driven by its cash-saving mission, with little discernible regard
to the importance of the external audit function ... (JCPA, 1988,
Minutes ofEvidence, Inquiry into the AAO, p.536)15.
Apart from uncertainty about the constitutional position of the state auditor
engendered by the method of his appointment, as noted above, the apparent close
relationship between the Executive and the state auditor has continued to sustain
confusion amongst supposedly well-informed senior officers in government
departments as to the role of the state auditor in departmental administration. The
Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration in 1991 highlighted
the confusion and "misunderstanding of the role of an auditor". They thought it should
be made very clear to all auditees in the public sector that
audit is not a service to management .... The purpose of audit is to
provide an independent report on management, not a service to it.
Management freedom should apply to management functions but the
appointment of the auditor is the prerogative of the owners (Parliament)
(Quoted during Senate debates, 17 June 1991, p.4846).
As a result of a very public disagreement with the Treasurer, John Dawkins, Auditor-
General John Taylor in May 1993 observed that
departments are not giving good advice about the independence of the
Parliament's auditor. Departments seem to believe that I work for them
and therefore I should be more circumspect. They are giving advice
which is coloured by self interest; ... (they are) not interested in public
exposure of their faults (Financial Forum, Vo1.2, No.6, July 1993)
If the heads of departments and their staff can still be confused by the contradictions in
the state auditor's mandate and independence, then the general public's understanding
also should be cause for concern.
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In light of the long historical association of the Treasury with the state auditor in
Australia it is hardly surprising that the state auditor, despite the obvious resource
limitations he has faced, has not always been insistent that the system should change.
Auditor-General Steele Craik believed that "(g)iven the continued co-operation by the
Public Service Board and the Treasury, I see no particular reason to urge any changes
to the status quo" (AAO, Fourth Submission to the RCAGA, 1974, p.3). The AAO
referred in its Auditing Standards in 1987 to this being a
sensitive area in relationships between the Auditor-General and the
executive ... In some degree, arrangements for the Auditor-General's
resource provision may be related to the executive government's
financial situation and general expenditure policies. As against that,
effective promotion of public accountability requires that the AAO be
provided with sufficient resources to enable the Auditor-General to
discharge his or her responsibilities in a reasonable manner
(para.2.2.2.5).
Throughout the eighties the Senate became increasingly concerned about
encroachments on the state auditor's independence through pressures on his Office's
resources". As the antipathy of the Executive has increased towards the state auditor
so the Senate has risen as his effective and watchful champion. This has caused a shift
in the fulcrum of Executive accountability from the House of Representatives to the
Senate. Historically the proportional representation system of voting by which the
Senate is elected has meant that the Executive has not been able to control the Senate
on the same consistent basis as it has the Lower House. It is in the Senate that the
remnants of parliamentary control have found their last and often beleaguered bastion.
In particular, the growth of the Senate's committee system has provided the Senate
with the organisation and the bite it required to hold the Executive to account. The
Coalition Opposition in the Senate maintained that
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a strong and independent Auditor-General and Australian Audit Office
are fundamental to the credibility of audit opinions and the effectiveness
of the Auditor-General and his staff Independence has diminished
practical value unless the Auditor-General has the human and material
resources to exercise his responsibility (Watson, Senate debates, 6 April
1989, p.1107).
The most worrying aspect of resource limitations on the ANAO and control of
resource decisions by the ANAO's largest and most important auditee, the Department
ofFinance, has been the potential for this to be used to reduce the independence of the
Auditor-General by limiting the number and type of audits he is able to conduct.
Certainly this had been the case, the JCPA found in 1989, with the AAO's capacity to
carry out discretionary efficiency audits (Report 296, p.62). The Committee pointed
out that the AAO was the only department in a relationship of dependency with the
Department of Finance (DOF) which had the responsibility to examine DOF's
efficiency and effectiveness. In the circumstance it was easy to understand why
Auditors-General tend to make mild statements in their reports on
financial statements prepared by the Minister for Finance. Also of note
is that no Auditor-General has ever subjected any part of the
Department ofFinance to an efficiency audit (JCPA, Report 296, 1989,
p.68).
It has been hazardous for the Auditor-General to subject the auditee from which his
Office gains its sustenance to sustained, detailed and frequent investigation. Auditor-
General Monaghan complained about "an inherent conflict of interest in the present
arrangements, where the Department of Finance is the main protagonist in the game"
(JCPA, 1988, Minutes of Evidence, Inquiry into the AAO, p.391). "For this reason",
the JCPA concluded, "it was wrong in principle for the Department of Finance to
continue to have the final powers of advice on the Australian Audit Office ..." (JCPA,
Report 296, 1989, p.68).
As the demands on his Office have grown, particularly in performance auditing, the
Auditor-General has been forced to confront the Executive for the long neglect of state
audit resources. At the same time he has exposed the inadequacy in the newly
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emerging managerial form of governance of the traditional foundations of state audit
independence (ANAO, Annual Report 1989-90, p.X; ANAO Annual Report 1990-91,
p.xiii; JCPA, Report 296, p.243; ANAO, Annual Report 1991-92, p.x; Canberra
Times, 12 September 1993, 4 and 7 February, 1994; Sydney Morning Herald, 9
February 1994; The Age, 12 February 1994; Financial Review, 15 and 18 February
1994; 171e Australian, 9 February, 1994; tt« Bulletin, 11 January 1994).
CONCLUSIONS
A stronger state auditor is not something which members of the Government
contemplate with enthusiasm, and something which the Opposition with its eye on
gaining office might be aware of pushing too hard. The 'trick' is for the Executive to
come up with the means ofcreating a convincing case for the independence of the state
auditor without actually aligning the image with a corresponding substantive basis. In
other words, the Executive wants the state auditor to act independently but not to be
independent. It wants the state auditor to carry out his work of certification but does
not want this to be beyond the control of the Executive. In the meantime, the ability of
the state auditor to ensure that the Executive in all its guises is held accountable
continues to suffer. Politics is above all else characterised by conflict and competition.
Political actors do not engage in political competition with the intention of being
content with grasping the prize for a limited period. The aim is to take the citadel of
power and to fortify it against all forces which attempt to usurp power. This may also
call for the incumbent to control any participants in the political process, no matter
how benign their motives, which could prove to be sources of threat by being useful to
the opposing forces.
The way ahead for the present Auditor-General promises to be even more difficult than
over recent years. The present Government has shown, especially in light of the
stresses which recent audit reports have placed upon the Government, that it will only
reluctantly improve the conditions impinging upon the independence and therefore
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effectiveness of the state auditor's Office. The Executive's historical neglect of the
audit is now out-of-step with developments in other countries where state audit has
become an essential component in strengthening accountability for efficient and
effective performance. Mounting pressures for change indicate that it seems unlikely
that the Australian Government will be able to hold out much longer and continue to
withhold from state audit the substantive independence which it has always been
denied. With substantive independence should also come the conclusion to the long
charade which has been the discourse of independence in Australian state audit.
Notes
I Unlcss indicated otherwise, the term state audit "ill refer to audit as practiced by the auditor of the
central government. In Australia this is the Commonwealth Auditor-General.
=senate debates and House of Representatives debates refer to the Australian Commonwealth
Parliament.
3Scnator Stone. formerly Secretary of the Treasury, referred to the British Audit Act prior to the audit
reforms of 1983 as "virtually identical with our present system" (Senate debates, 1 November 1989).
Auditor-General Steele Craik noted that most of the features of his office compared very closely with
that of his British counterparts (sec Lusher, HR debates, 13 October 1981, p.1915).
'1>riorto 1988 the ANAO was knownas the Australian Audit Office (AAO). Throughout this paper
ANAO will be the preferred term.
SIn Dicken's Great Expectations, the wedding cake kept for 50 years by the jilted Miss Havisham
crumbled to dust at the first touch.
~tate audit is composed of two clements: the state auditor, called the Auditor-General in Australia,
and the officers of the state auditor who cam' out the audits.
7Thc masculine form ofaddress in relation t~ the Auditor-General will be used because no women
have been appointed to this position.
~ay's 'self estrangement thCOI)" determines that most people are unaware of the dichotomous
existence they experience: that "human existence is split into two spheres, the manifest/ordinary and
the hidden! extraordinary" (quoted in Dillard 1991, p.15). The former is seen and sensed. The
.hidden' consists of those belief systems. conventions, social structures and practices which by their
ancestry and diffusion remain unchallenged. These constitute the substance of a discourse. Kress
(1985) defines discourses as "systcmatically-organlsed sets of statements which give expression to the
meanings and values of an institution" (p.6). Discourses provide the means to construct a persuasive
reality through their unobtrusive ability to
define. describe and delimit what it is possible to say and not possible to say (and by
extension- what it is possible to do and not to do) with respect to the area of concern of that
institution ... A discourse provides a set of possible statements about a given area, and
organises and gives structure to the manner in which a particular topic, object, process is to
be talked about. In that it provides descriptions, rules, permissions and prohibitions of social
and individual actions (Kress 1985, pp.6-7 in Yeatman 1990, p.164).
~ulZ and Sharaf in their classic study of audit referred to audit independence having three parts:
programming independence, which provides freedom from control or undue influence in the selection
of audit techniques; investigation independence, which gives the auditor the freedom to select audit
targets and reporting independence. whereby the auditor is not inhibited in the reporting of the results
ofaudits (sec Knighton 1979. p.6).
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1<The ANAO in its Auditing Standards also refers to functional independence but does not define the
term (1987. s.2.2.2.9). This is the only instance of the use of the term in the Standards. In an earlier
section of the Standards the ANAO docs note that "the Auditor-General would not look to the
Parliament for specific guidance in the programming, planning and execution of audits" (s.2.2.1.3).
The reader is left to tic the term .functional independence' with this definition of the state auditor's
independence. Auditor-General Monaghan later uses the term in his submission to the JCPA Inquiry
into the AAO in 1988 (Minutes of Evidence, p.535).
"Recent examples include Steele Craik (1973-1981), Brigden (1981-1985), Monaghan (1985-1987)
and Taylor (1988-1995).
I:For example Steele Craik (Auditor-General 1973-1981) came from the Treasury, John Monaghan
(1984-1987) and John Taylor (1988-) from, at various times, the Public Service Board (in Monaghan's
case he was a Commissioner of the Board) and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
(Taylor. JCPA. 1988. Minutes of Evidence, Inquiry into the MO, p.569).
13Sir Robert Menzies. as Prime Minister, thought it
clear that the ... Auditor-General is not an officer of the Parliament in the sense that he is
subject to the direction of either House, or in the sense that an attempt to obstruct him in the
course of his duties would constitute a contempt of either House (HR debates, 5 November
1952. p.3).
1.$ln 1988 these responsibilities were assumed by the DOF at the urging of the Auditor-General. He
had argued that by separating consideration of his resource needs from that of the Prime Minister's
portfolio his Officc would be less likely to suffer in the competition for resources. His hopes of more
equitable and liberal treatment under the DOF were soon shown to be unfounded. (JCPA, Report 296,
1989. p.67). PM&C was still responsible for administering sections 3 to 9A of the Audit Act which
cover the appointment of the Auditor-General.
15Attacks such as this by Monaghan, and earlier by Brigden (see Annual Report of the Auditor-
General 1983-8../). were virtually unknown prior to the problems experienced with the introduction of
efficiency auditing between 1978-8~ (JCPA. 1988, Hewson, Minutes of Evidence, Inquiry into the
AAO. p.6O-I).
16ft also worried the British PAC in 1980 that "however independent of Government the Exchequer
and Audit Department may consider its audit functions to be, the department cannot be truly
independent of the executive if its numbers and gradings are controlled by the Civil Service
Department" (the equivalent of the Public Service Board in Australia) (Great Britain, 1981, Inquiry
into the Role ofthe Comptroller and Auditor-General, p.Li).
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